The future of food security in the Three Areas of Sudan

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Currently, the pace of recovery in the ‘Three Areas’ is moving faster than the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). This gap is leading to greater imbalances in income, unsustainable urbanisation, overexploitation of the environment and resource-based conflict. Unless regulated, the likely result will be chronic poverty and an undermining of the success of the CPA. Agencies must be mindful of how they provide assistance so that they support the CPA. The analysis of food security should take place in the context of a larger political, social and economic analysis of the emerging situation. The least developed areas should be prioritised and interventions should provide benefits to the full range of socioeconomic groups. WFP must identify its role in the wider and integrated response. It should support the emerging peace process and the key reforms. If WFP chooses to consolidate its activities, it will require capable strategic partners. If it chooses to invest more in building the capacity of government and community structures, it must improve its skill base and field presence.

Keywords: Blue Nile and Abyei, food insecurity, internally displaced persons, land reform, Nuba Mountains, recovery, Southern Kordofan

Introduction

In the next five years food security in the ‘Three Areas’ of Abyei, Southern Kordofan state and Blue Nile state will depend on the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), and on the rapidly emerging recovery process. The critical question for the World Food Programme (WFP) and other agencies is: whose recovery strategy should they promote?

Currently, there are many, often competing, recovery strategies, focusing on the priorities of returning internally displaced persons (IDPs), the poor, the majority of the population, private investors, farmers, nomads, people in urban areas, the parties to the peace agreement and the wider international community. The main cause of current food insecurity is the recent war, which gave rise to large numbers of IDPs and relatively higher levels of poverty in war-affected areas. If the current stability continues, the causes of food insecurity could become linked to the new, uncertain and rapid process of recovery. If left unmanaged, the recovery process could further entrench chronic poverty, lead to an increase in resource-based conflict and undermine the success of the peace agreement.

There is not yet a single and overarching recovery strategy in place for agencies to follow and promote. It is hoped that the CPA will provide guidance to enable such a strategy to be devised. WFP must review its strengths and identify its role in a wider and integrated response that addresses needs while supporting a just and lasting peace.
Background: the national importance of the ‘Three Areas’

Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile have an estimated combined area of 196,000 km² (JAM, 2004 and Sudan Integrated Mapping, 2006) and an estimated population of 3.9 million people (JAM, 2005). It is estimated that 700,000 people have been displaced from the Three Areas and 300,000 are displaced inside them (JAM, 2005).

The Three Areas are important to securing a national peace. The protocol for Southern Kordofan state and Blue Nile state recognises these states as a ‘model for solving the problems throughout the country’ (CPA, 2005). The Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) Joint Vision Statement reinforces this, calling the Three Areas ‘models for peaceful co-existence’ (JAM, 2004). Abyei is also important as a North–South bridge and, given its unique political arrangement as part of both the north and the south, it should ‘greatly contribute to stabilizing the fragile national vision of making unity attractive’ (ACDC, 2004). Success in these areas will have a positive impact on national stability.

The areas are also economically important to the country. Abyei is a major trade link between the North, Bahr El Ghazal and Western Equatoria in the South, and is rich in oil and pasture. Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile are significant surplus-crop producing areas, mostly from mechanised or semi-mechanised rain-fed and irrigated farms, and they produce surplus livestock for the northern markets as well as markets in the Middle East. Both areas also produce and export gum Arabic, wood products, fruits and vegetables. Southern Kordofan has oil and the oil pipeline passes through it. There is gold in Blue Nile state. The Blue Nile river has a hydroelectric dam and the Dinder National Park is also in the state. Although these areas have contributed to the national economy, the way in which commercial production was developed is considered to be one of the root causes of the war (Matus, 2006).

The peace agreement for Southern Kordofan state and Blue Nile state is not the final solution to the political conflict in the two states (CPA, 2005). The agreement defers resolution of many of the core grievances that gave rise to the conflict to the new integrated state and national government, commissions, the constitution, legislation and, ultimately, the popular consultation to be held after the elections. Although the protocol provides a strong framework, the detail of critical issues such as land reform, decentralisation and the devolution of authority, managing imbalances in development and underdevelopment, and the participation of the people in government are still in the process of being worked out. The agreement will only become final after it reflects the ‘aspirations’ of the people through the popular consultation (CPA, 2005).

The Three Areas are among the least developed in Sudan (JAM, 2004) and contain significant internal imbalances in development (NMPACT, 2004 and 2006). These imbalances are seen in their limited infrastructures—especially roads, local government capacity, water, health, education, extension services and incomes. These are the areas from which the most people were displaced during the war, and these people are trying now to return to (WFP, 2006b).
The most food-insecure groups

Currently, the most food-insecure areas are those which were most affected by the war and to which many impoverished displaced people are now returning (WFP, 2006a). These people incur high costs to support their return, resettlement and reintegration. Their capacity to return varies. Many of the poorest displaced people are not able to reach or stay in their original homes, but instead are ending up on the periphery of urban and market centres (WFP, 2006b). Although they may find more immediate cash income and services there, they are less likely to be supported by relatives or residents. In a slightly better position are the poorer people recently returned to their homes who are being taken care of by their relatives or host families. They are better able to be absorbed in these areas but, in many cases, there is still limited land for agriculture and some lack skills because they have been away from their homes for up to 20 years.

There are also families moving back to rural villages who are having difficulties because their potential hosts are still displaced. Finally, also among the food insecure is the poorer resident population who are now competing with the people who have returned. They compete for work, off-farm products and petty trade, as well as support from relatives—and are constrained by the increased demand for grain and related increases in grain prices.

Most of the displaced people are likely to return home in the next couple of years. The JAM estimates that 68 per cent of the population will return by 2010 with numbers peaking in 2006 and 2007. In Abyei it is estimated that 85% of the population were displaced by the war (ACDC, 2004). In Southern Kordofan (excluding Abyei) WFP estimates that 250,000 more people may return to the state by the end of the year (WFP, 2006). This does not take account of the effects of the widespread displacement inside the state into larger towns, organised villages and camps, and into and around the hills. In Blue Nile WFP estimates that 103,000 people will return home this year (WFP, 2006). UNHCR is beginning to bring refugees back from Ethiopia. The increased food needs caused by people returning will be balanced by the rapidly increasing productivity of the residents. Access to food will be the crucial issue.

What will people do?

The emerging livelihood systems are new partially because the peace agreement changes the reality. In Addition, over 20 years of war and displacement to urban areas and abroad have changed the composition of society as well as people’s skills and aspirations. Population numbers in most areas are significantly higher, in many cases even higher than before the start of the war. Technology and strategies to promote livelihood security have also changed in the past 20 years.

The direction that livelihood systems will take is uncertain and is likely to vary. It is uncertain because livelihood recovery is still linked to the implementation of the CPA, and implementation of the agreement in the Three Areas is a far behind schedule. The government is also new and changing, and many critical legal and policy reforms
remain unresolved, especially with regard to rights to land. It is uncertain also because the amounts and types of future government investment are unclear—specifically, whether it will prioritize infrastructure, fund settlement or resettlement and pay compensation, and the approach it will take to nomads, sub-surface investment and agricultural investment. The future of private investment and international aid is also unclear. Finally, it is uncertain because Sudanese society is changing under internal and external, Arabic, African, Western, Eastern and internal Sudanese, influences.

Livelihood recovery is rapid for some populations. This may include IDPs who have returned with assets such as cash, skills and status and who can gain access to land. In the areas least affected by the war, where most people are relatively well-off and have access to more arable land, infrastructure and services, households are quickly expanding their economic activities (IFAD, 2006). The mechanised sector is likely to expand and the government continues to issue leases (Gullick, 2005). Even in the war-affected and food-deficit areas, recovery is likely to be fast for people with assets—especially land.

During the war, in the war-affected and food-insecure areas, there was little incentive for people who could produce surplus crops or livestock to do so. Surpluses would often make people targets of insecurity, or they would have to share with others such as displaced relatives and neighbours. The local market was small and most people had little purchasing power. Cross-border trade was risky, commodities were hard to transport and the traders offered low prices for local products. High taxation and insecurity also limited movement between markets. There was little credit, or credit on reasonable terms, to support increased investment (Maxwell, 2006). As the situation becomes more stable, households with land and money—or at least enough active members—are likely to shift from minimising risk by accessing multiple sources of food and cash to investing in and concentrating on a few such sources.

The likely consequences of rapid, unplanned and differentiated recovery

The slow implementation of the CPA means that recovery is taking place in the absence of the new laws and policies based on the agreement, and of institutions to enforce the reforms. The likely consequences of rapid, unplanned and differentiated recovery are:

Widening geographic and socioeconomic disparities as poor people and poorer areas get left behind and possibly become even worse off while better-off areas and groups, especially the large commercial investors, become wealthier. The poorer households will mainly invest their labour, selling it and collecting off-farm products to cover their food and cash needs. This can provide immediate income but also hinders their own longer-term productive investment. These differences are likely to be compounded by a rise in population and increased competition.

Increased urbanisation as people look for jobs, food and services and the population of urban areas and market towns increases. Destitute households are likely to get stuck without their social networks and become highly vulnerable to violence, hunger and illness.
Environmental degradation as the environment is overexploited and damaged. Areas will be used for resettlement, cleared for expanding farms, cut for charcoal, and used for construction to support the scaling-up of services, new infrastructure and building. As urban areas expand, and if large-scale commercial investment expands, the environment will suffer further.

Increased resource-based conflict linked to more people returning to areas than had lived there before the war, more and new nomads with larger herds moving through certain areas, expanding commercial investment in sectors such as gum Arabic and mechanised agriculture, increasing environmental degradation and growing urban areas. Competition for resources will increase. The slow implementation of the CPA, and a society militarised and polarised by over 20 years of war, makes the potential for violent conflict high.

If the recovery process is not managed well, the likely results will be chronic poverty and increased conflict, which could ultimately undermine the prospects of the CPA achieving a just and lasting solution to the conflict in the Three Areas and, because of their importance, nationally. If WFP is not careful about how it supports different livelihood groups, private investors, and state or non-state internal or external actors as they emerge—and often compete—it could do more harm than good. Recovery is taking place with little outside support. The focus should therefore be more on managing potential problems and tensions linked to recovery than promoting recovery. Agencies’ livelihoods recovery strategies should be guided by what the parties to the CPA have already agreed in the CPA and other frameworks and processes such as the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) and the Nuba Mountains Programme for Advancing Conflict Transformation (NMPACT).

Guidance from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

The CPA provides a number of objectives and principles that can help to guide the recovery process. The three most important parameters are: (a) that it must fit the aspirations of the people through participatory, democratic and decentralised government; (b) that the least developed areas and poorest people will be brought up to the same level of development as the national average without discrimination; and (c) that customary rights, traditions and beliefs will be recognised and respected. WFP should ensure that its interventions are based on need, prioritise the least developed areas to enable them to reach parity with the rest of the country, and assist with building a responsive and capable local government that is able to ensure the well being of its people.

Using the CPA to guide food security programmes during recovery

A guiding framework

Beyond promoting the least developed areas and ensuring that development is equitable, the overall recovery framework in the CPA is not explicit. Figure 1 provides one
framework for the different phases of sound recovery. The basic premise is to promote self-reliance among the poorest groups and in the poorest areas before attempting to link them economically with better-off areas or wealthier investors. Promoting integration while these areas and people are poor would place them in a weak and easily exploited position. If these communities are in a position of economic strength, interventions can focus on interdependence and building positive economic exchanges where both parties are in a position to negotiate and benefit.

In the Three Areas, where a small number of large-scale investors dominate the economy, the majority of people compete against each other for jobs. They have little control over investment or the benefits obtained from it. Moving from this state of dependence on outside investors or local elites to independence and self-reliance will mean securing rights to the land for the majority, that is, customary rights, to enable people to set the terms of trade and negotiate benefits from investment. It also requires improved access to fair credit in order to build up assets, the provision of insurance for investment, the development of local skills, and technology in order to develop the local economic capacity successfully. Using this recovery framework, which begins with affirmative action including the protection of the poor before integration, is one way to promote the agreement.

Reforms of laws and policies
The most critical laws and policies that affect food security and economic growth relate to people’s rights and access to land. For the majority of people in the Three Areas

![Figure 1 The three-phase recovery framework](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Three phases</th>
<th>General characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interdependence</td>
<td>Positive economic interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Win–win relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Open system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Horizontal integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accumulation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence</td>
<td>Self-reliant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not/minimal dependent on outside factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Isolated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minimal integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidation</td>
<td>Depend highly on outside for survival and quality of life/very poor terms of trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Highly vulnerable to outside shocks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Least control over life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Win–los relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Open relationship but high risk and vulnerability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependence</td>
<td>Vertical integration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Modelled from *The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People* (Covey, 1989).
the main sources of food and cash incomes are on- and off-farm production. The 1970 Unregistered Land Act, reinforced by the 1983 Civil Transaction Act, made all unregistered land national property. The customary rights of the overwhelming majority of people were ignored, making them squatters on their own land. Large-scale external investment, mainly in agriculture and gum Arabic, provides few—mostly employment—benefits to those people with customary claims.

The CPA recognises the importance of land reform to securing peace but does not set out the fine detail of new land laws. The Wealth Sharing Agreement states that ‘without prejudice to the position of the Parties with respect to ownership of land and subterranean natural resources, including Southern Sudan, this Agreement is not intended to address the ownership of those resources.’ The parties have agreed to establish a process to resolve this issue (CPA, 2005). The parties go on to agree to a process for amending the laws to ‘incorporate customary laws and practices, local heritage and international trends and practices’ (CPA, 2005). They have also agreed to decentralise and devolve government, to set up a National Land Commission to manage disputes by applying the laws of the locality (CPA, 2005).

According to the protocol for Southern Kordofan state and Blue Nile state, ‘regulation of the land tenure, usage and exercise of rights in land shall be a concurrent competency exercised by the National and State Governments’ (CPA, 2005). Each state will have a Land Commission, which will have the power to review existing land leases and contracts and to examine the criteria for the current land allocations (CPA, 2005). The critical steps for making legal reforms in the agreement for the two states are: (a) the state and national constitutions; (b) legislation passed through the appointed state and national parliaments; (c) legislation passed through the newly elected state and national parliaments; and (d) the popular consultation. The new laws should devolve authority over land to the lowest level possible and recognise customary rights as equal to other private rights—ideally, regardless of whether they are registered. The state Land Commissions, which also require a law to put them in place, will use the new legal framework as the basis for resolving claims. Communities can then go to the commission to review their claims and secure either a return of their land or be compensated for their losses. At the lowest level possible, communities must also organise to draw up their laws and policies and to manage their resources based on best practice. If these steps are taken, investors will become partners with people who have rights over their land instead of making investment arrangements solely with the government.

Land use management will improve. Much of the large-scale agricultural practice is unsustainable. Trees are stripped, soil exhausted and new areas are continuously opened for cultivation in order to maintain production levels. Forming partnerships with the people who have a long-term interest in the resource should lead to more sustainable use (Gullick, 2005). Land reform can be achieved while these areas continue to provide food and other resources that are in the national interests.

Both IFAD and USAID have been working with communities to strengthen their capacity to identify and manage land. Land reform projects began with the now long-running IFAD community resource management and empowerment projects and
the USAID pilot community land security project undertaken through the US Department of Agriculture. USDA/USAID has been providing advice on the new land laws based on modern trends and best practice, and is working with communities to identify their customary claims through a process of negotiation with neighbouring communities. This process will assist people later when making a claim to the Land Commission, and it will help them to manage their resources. By working at both the state and the community levels, the project provides a good mechanism for coordinating interventions in support of land reform.

The land reform process that is just getting under way has three implications for agencies. First, agencies must be careful when promoting economic activities ahead of the resolution of contentious issues such as resettlement, water rights and pasture development, as well as the initiation of large-scale agriculture or off-farm programmes. Second, agencies can assist with developing laws and policies based on best practice that reflect the aspirations of the people. Third, and most importantly, agencies can help people to clarify their demands, communicate with their government and make informed choices in the popular consultation.

Other key legal and policy issues include the decentralisation of local government, the establishment of a state welfare system and the role of subsidies in promoting economic growth. The laws and related policies are relevant to determining which level of government is responsible for supporting livelihood security, and how the poorest areas and groups will receive assistance in order to achieve internal national parity.

The implications for information collection and analysis
From food insecurity to food security or livelihood security
The main cause of food insecurity in the future will shift from war to people’s ability to manage recovery. Food security assessments typically focus on how households respond to the loss of one or more source of food or income and their ability to reach self-sufficiency. There should be a greater focus on how households are trying to improve their lives overall, beyond basic subsistence. Analysis should reflect emerging trends and identify early either a deterioration or the onset of chronic problems. This should be done while monitoring the evolving and uncertain political, economic, social and legal environment. In addition, the baseline must be updated and expanded as the situation changes. Its purpose is to explain how the economy functions in good years and typically responds to stress. It provides a yardstick against which changes can be monitored in people’s access to food and cash income. As the situation changes, so should the baseline.

The problem and the solution: description or prescription?
Many agencies and government bodies focus their analysis on understanding the nature, severity and scope of problems and needs. They use far less effort to assess and analyse possible solutions to address needs and solve problems. Identifying solutions requires
more and different information than is required to undertake a needs assessment. It means finding a balance between what is feasible and what is desirable among different potential solutions. Determining feasibility requires information about the likelihood of success of the different approaches. Determining desirability requires guiding principles that help to identify the ideal solution, which should be based on an understanding of the short- and long-term, direct and indirect, and social, political, and economic effects of the different solutions. The CPA provides these principles.

**Integrated interventions: something for everyone**

As is stated above, the first priority is to strengthen the poorest communities so they are in a better position to integrate. Ideally, the least developed areas should be supported directly with food and cash income opportunities, more services, infrastructure and local government and civil society organisation/community-based organisation capacity. An integrated approach such as the one shown in figure 2 provides benefits for all groups in a community and incentives to move away from free food and other services. The poorest people in the chart are the people who qualify for welfare.

This type of model can also be extended geographically, especially if differences in wealth are largely determined by where someone lives.

**Figure 2 An integrated food security response**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Poorest</th>
<th>Poor</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Better-off</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Free</td>
<td>Subsidised Conditional assistance</td>
<td>Food or cash for work, credit for loans, training, cheaper goods, grain banks, seed banks, extension with some payment, blacksmiths, trade, crafts organisation, improving storage and improving processing, cheaper transportation.</td>
<td>Get money from sale for food, livestock and seed for local purchase programme, extension, reduced burden of caring for very poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash, food aid, non-food items, seeds, tools, distribution in general, distribution ideally from local purchase, free extension</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free schooling, healthcare and water</td>
<td>Subsidised education, healthcare and water</td>
<td></td>
<td>Full-cost education, healthcare and water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved security (police, landmine, monitoring)</td>
<td>Improved quantity and quality of basic services</td>
<td>Capacity building of CSO, CBOs and local government</td>
<td>Pro-poor economic policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased access to land including natural resources</td>
<td>Environmental protection and promotion</td>
<td>People-to-people dialogue (i.e. nomad-farmer)</td>
<td>Increased communication and transport infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring geographic differences in development planning using principle of equity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Modelled on the Nuba Food Security Working Group, phase III, Food Security Programme, 2002
The implications for WFP

Even with a limited response, because of its large presence WFP can play a critical role in promoting the CPA. It can promote the use of its guiding principles in particular by advocating for the interests and aspirations of the poorest people, securing access for marginalised groups, promoting interventions based on need and recognising customary rights to land.

WFP must decide the degree to which it wants to expand, contribute to a wider livelihood analysis, and contribute and respond to a wider discussion about alternative interventions to address food insecurity. It must decide how much it can invest in supporting the emerging state and local governments and how much more closely it can work with communities as they navigate this uncertain, confusing and often tense period. WFP will also have to find a way to address food needs in an expanding economic but conflict-prone environment.

Information and analysis

WFP should monitor the implementation of the CPA carefully, including the formation of the new government, the security situation, the development of laws and policies and the progress made in resolving outstanding grievances such as land claims. It should continue to follow the wider development process of infrastructure, water, healthcare and education. WFP should update its baseline and focus more on economic recovery trends. It should continue to monitor the effect of its interventions on markets, and to support sensitive resettlement programmes. WFP should make certain that it participates in the wider analysis of inequities and in the debate to identify the optimum interventions.

From general distribution to becoming part of the integrated response

There will be several implications for WFP programming if it chooses to support the CPA as part of an integrated response. The first is that local purchasing should be attempted in food insecure areas rather than with a few large-scale producers. Many food insecure areas have the potential to produce surpluses but, until now, they have lacked the incentive and an insurance safety net to risk investing heavily in a single income source such as agriculture. Undertaking local purchasing requires a strategic link to farmers’ organisations, trades unions, cooperatives and local agencies engaged in agricultural extension. An offer to purchase food may stimulate production. This should be balanced against the demands of IDPs, many of whom are arriving with cash and trying to buy food. If local purchase from household-level production is not feasible, imported food aid at this stage is more desirable than buying from the small number of elite large-scale farmers.

It is easier to buy food from a few big producers or traders but it is not ideal for economic recovery or supporting the CPA. Buying from household-level producers will distribute benefits more widely and will not reinforce the economic elite or widen the income gap. Given the sensitivities around the mechanised sector and the emerging
land reform process, continuing to buy from a few producers could easily undermine the resolution of important grievances from the past conflict.

The second implication is that WFP’s current criteria for who receives food aid should be split. ‘Free’ food aid or cash should go to the very poorest and eventually form part of the government welfare system. The hungry poor who have also been receiving food aid should be supported but with some conditions, for example, with subsidies that support agriculture, strategic reserves, school feeding, seed and grain banks, market purchases that level out seasonal fluctuations or increase availability and agricultural support rations as well as conditional assistance such as providing credit or work for goods, food and/or and cash.

Finally, food or cash-for-work interventions can be strategically directed to support important elements of the recovery in the framework of the CPA, including infrastructure improvement, the expansion of services and training, and peace building.

**Handing over responsibility: who will eventually take over from WFP?**

WFP is likely to still be an important actor in 2011 but, if stability continues, it should develop an exit strategy and decide which agency or agencies will eventually take responsibility for managing both chronic and acute food insecurity. The people and the market should make the biggest contribution to improving food security. It is unrealistic, however, in a poor country such as Sudan to think that there will not be areas or groups with chronic food insecurity or events, natural or man-made, that will create hunger. WFP and other humanitarian agencies share their current responsibility with social networks and institutions and with the government. Where social networks, institutions and governments function well in providing a safety net, the WFP is not needed. Therefore, the success of WFP in achieving its mandate of food security has little to do with the success of WFP in providing food aid. It is linked to the successes of people and the market, to social networks and institutions, and to the government.

The general challenge for WFP’s exit strategy is that these political, social or economic systems do not intrinsically prioritise the care of those people with the greatest needs. In fact, the people with the greatest needs are often marginalised by all three systems. Political, economic and social power rarely, if ever, equates to the demands of the humanitarian imperative. In Sudan this challenge is even greater. Throughout the more than 20 years’ of violent civil war, numerous famines and widespread displacement, there was a massive international relief operation that was largely responsible for addressing humanitarian needs. WFP must work cautiously when handing over its responsibility to the new post-agreement government. In addition, the war and now the return of millions of people have altered how social networks and institutions perceive themselves and care for their members. WFP must also be cautious when handing over responsibility to these systems. Finally, economic recovery—especially if unregulated—can further entrench chronic poverty and create conflict.

WFP must have a clear position on how to promote or in some cases not undermine Sudan’s internal capacity to reduce needs and provide a safety net for the poorest. How it does this should be guided by the CPA but especially by the principles of equity and democracy.
Conclusions

The war was the main cause of food insecurity. The recovery strategy should do the most to support the new peace. New and uncertain economic strategies are rapidly emerging and these could potentially create more problems than they address. Given the sensitivity of the political and social environment, agencies engaged in food security interventions need sound principles and a wider perspective to guide how they promote recovery. WFP must decide whether to consolidate and build on its strengths to make more strategic alliances or to extend its responses to include more capacity building and community development. Either way, it must work within an agreed and integrated recovery framework, and towards eventually handing over its responsibility for addressing food needs.

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Endnotes


References


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